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ST. LOUIS
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Vol. XVIII FEBRUARY, 1933 No. 2
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SECTIONS 95-110,*
WITH MISSOURI ANNOTATIONSt
BY TYRRELL WILLIAMS
FORMATION OF FORMAL CONTRACTS-
CONTRACTS UNDER SEAL
Section
95. Requirements for sealed
contract
96. Definition of a seal
97. Promise is sealed if prom-
isor affixes or adopts a seal
98. What amounts to adoption
of a seal
99. Any number of parties
may adopt the same seal
100. Recital of sealing or de-
livery is unnecessary
101. Sealed promise may be de-
livered unconditionally or
in escrow
102. What amounts to uncondi-
tional delivery
103. What amounts to delivery
in escrow and its effect
Section
104. Acceptance by the prom-
isee generally unneces-
sary; disclaimer permitted
105. Acceptance by the prom-
isee, when necessary to
create contractual obliga-
tion
106. What amounts to accept-
ance of instrument
107. Acceptance by promisee
may create informal con-
tract
108. Promisor a n d promisee
must be named or de-
scribed in the writing
109. Promisee may e n f o r c e
sealed contract though he
does not sign or seal it
110. Sealed contract does not
need consideration
Scope Note: The formation of recognizances and the for-
mation of negotiable instruments (though both recognizances
* Copyright, 1928, The American Law Institute.
t Copyright, 1933, by Washington University. Previous sections of the Re-
statement, similarly annotated, will be found in the ST. Louis LAW REVIEW
for December, 1930, February, 1931, June, 1931, December, 1931, and Decem-
ber, 1932.
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and negotiable instruments are classified as formal contracts
in Section 7) are not included within the scope of this Chap-
ter. The formation of recognizances is statutory, and the
entire law of negotiable instruments is best stated separately
from the law of other contracts.
Section 95. REQUIREMENTS FOR SEALED CONTRACT.
The requirements of the law for the formation of a contract
under seal are:
(a) A sealed written promise and delivery, either uncondition-
ally or in escrow, of the document containing it; and if the delivery
is in escrow, the happening of the condition on which delivery is
made;
(b) A promisor and a promisee each of whom has legal capacity
to act as such in the proposed sealed contract; and each of whom is
so named or described in the document as to be capable of identi-
fication when it is delivered;
(c) Acceptance by the promisee or grantee in the case stated in
Section 105;
(d) That the transaction, though satisfying the previous re-
quirements, must not be void by statute or by special rules of the
common law.
Special Note: The law regarding contracts under seal has
been much changed by statute in many States of the United
States. In nearly half of the States the distinction between
sealed and unsealed writings is abolished. In a number of
other States statutes vary the effect which the common law
gave to seals.
Comment:
a. The explanation of these requirements is given in Sections
96-110. The word "written" in this section and hereafter, and
the word "writing" include printing and other means of im-
pressing characters on paper or other substance. The non-
existence of one or more of the requisites stated in this section
does not preclude the formation of an informal contract if the
requisites for such a contract exist.
b. A contract under seal is almost invariably signed, but such
a contract is possible without signature.
Annotation:
This Section is introductory to Chapter 4. In reading over
Chapter 4, a Missouri lawyer should observe the following points.
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(1) According to the Restatement a contract means a binding
promise. See Section 1. A deed to land, in so far as it is merely
a conveyance, is not a contract because it contains no promise. A
warranty deed is a contract only in so far as the warranties are
concerned. A deed which contains a condition of future per-
formance by the grantee, if accepted by the grantee, is a contract
in so far as it may imply a promise to perform by the grantee.
This narrow limitation of the word "contract" is not always recog-
nized in Missouri law. Since 1845 "a specialty or other written
contract" has been a statutory phrase. R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 954.
(2) According to the Restatement a promise under seal is oper-
ative without any consideration. See Section 110. Missouri
very radically has modified this rule of the common law in a suc-
cession of statutes, the most important being the Act of 1893, now
known as R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 2957. For a brief discussion of the
statutory modifications see Annotation under Section 110.
(3) According to the Restatement, a sealed unilateral contract
is binding as soon as delivered without regard to acceptance, al-
though there is a condition subsequent that the promisee may dis-
claim the contract. See Section 104. This is not in accord with
Missouri law. See Annotation under Section 104.
(4) The distinctive legal relationship described in the Restate-
ment as a sealed contract does not now exist in Missouri.
(5) Missouri recognizes a special class of signed written con-
tracts which are intended not to be effective until delivery. The
delivery may be either unconditional or in escrow. These con-
tracts in Missouri are in certain respects similar to the sealed con-
tract of the Restatement. Therefore, this Chapter 4 of the Re-
statement is helpful to Missouri lawyers.
Section 96. DEFINITION OF A SEAL.
A seal is a piece of wax, a wafer or other substance, affixed to
the paper or other material on which a promise, release or convey-
ance is written, or a scroll or sign, however made, on such paper
or other material, or an impression made thereon; provided that
by a recital or by the appearance of the document an intention of
the promisor, releasor or grantor is manifested that the substance,
scroll, sign or impression shall be a seal.
Comment:
a. The definition of a seal in this Section is broader than that
of the common law in most States, but statutes have generally ex-
tended the rule as far as is here stated.
b. Under this Section the question whether a seal is upon a
document is to be determined from the document itself. Evi-
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dence of extrinsic circumstances is not admissible to prove or dis-
prove this. Such circumstances may, however, be shown to aid
the determination of the questions whether a promisor affixed or
adopted a seal (see Section 98) and whether the document has
been delivered (see Section 102).
Annotation:
Since the Act of 1893, the addition of a seal to any written in-
strument signed by an individual is superfluous and without legal
effect. State v. Tobie (1897) 141 Mo. 547, 42 S. W. 1076. Be-
fore 1893 the law of Missouri was in accord with this Section.
The use of a scroll on a writing expressed to be sealed was author-
ized by statute. R. S. Mo. 1889, Sec. 2388. That statutory pro-
vision was repealed by the Act of 1893. For typical cases under
the old law see Pease v. Lawson (1862) 33 Mo. 35; Grimsley v.
Adm'rs of Riley (1838) 5 Mo. 280; Dickens v. Miller (1882) 12
Mo. App. 408. Under the language of the Act of 1893, R. S. Mo.
1929, Sec. 2957, the use of a seal by a corporation is still necessary
under some circumstances. See Annotation under Section 110.
Section 97. PROMISE IS SEALED IF PROMISOR AFFIXES OR ADOPTS
A SEAL.
A written promise is sealed if the promisor affixes or impresses
a seal on the document or adopts a seal already thereon.
Annotation:
This Section is without significance in modern Missouri law.
Before 1893 Missouri law was in accord. Groner v. Smith (1872)
49 Mo. 318.
Section 98. WHAT AMOUNTS TO ADOPTION OF A SEAL.
(1) A promisor who delivers a written promise to which a seal
has been previously affixed or impressed with apparent reference
to his signature, thereby adopts the seal.
(2) A promisor who delivers a written promise to which a seal
has been previously affixed or impressed with apparent reference
to the signature of another party to the document, is presumed to
have adopted the seal unless extrinsic circumstances show a con-
trary intention.
Comment:
a. Under the rule of Subsection (1) extrinsic evidence is not
admissible; under the rule of Subsection (2) such evidence is
admissible.
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Annotation:
This Section is without significance in modern Missouri law.
Before 1893 Missouri law was in accord. See Underwood v. Dol-
lins (1871) 47 Mo. 259, pertinent to Subsection (1); Lunsford v.
La Motte Lead Co. (1873) 54 Mo. 426, pertinent to Subsection (2).
Section 99. ANY NUMBER OF PARTIES MAY ADOPT THE SAME
SEAL.
Any number of parties to the same instrument may adopt one
seal.
Annotation:
This Section is without significance in modern Missouri law.
Before 1893 Missouri law was in accord. Burnett v. McCluey
(1883) 78 Mo. 676.
Section 100. RECITAL OF SEALING OR DELIVERY IS UNNECES-
SARY.
A recital of the sealing or of the delivery of a written promise
is not essential to its validity as a sealed contract.
Comment:
a. A recital may be of importance to show that a dash or scroll
after a signature is a seal (see Section 96) ; but the recital is not
an independent requirement, so that if a wafer or other object at-
tached to a written promise is evidently a seal, a sealed contract is
formed though there is no recital.
Annotation:
This Section is without significance in modern Missouri law.
Before 1893 Missouri law was in accord. Dingee v. Kearney
(1876) 2 Mo. App. 515.
Section 101. SEALED PROMISE MAY BE DELIVERED UNCON-
DITIONALLY OR IN ESCROW.
A promise under seal may be delivered by the promisor uncon-
ditionally, in which case there is a present contract under seal; or
may be delivered in escrow, in which case there is no present con-
tract under seal. Delivery may be made either unconditionally or
in escrow to the promisee or to any other person.
Comment:
a. This Section by its terms is applicable to the power of a
promisor to subject himself to a duty. It does not enable a
Washington University Open Scholarship
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promisor by inserting in a document not only his own promise,
but what purports to be a promise by the promisee, to subject the
latter to a duty by delivering the document to a third person. If,
however, a promisor attempts this, his own promise is likewise
ineffective until the promisee by accepting the document assents to
assume the stated duty (see Sections 105, 107).
Annotation:
In so far as this Section relates to written contracts intended to
be effective on delivery it is in accord with Missouri law, except
as indicated in Annotation to Section 104. Most of the Mis-
souri cases involving the principle of this Section relate to con-
veyances. Delivery of a deed is an essential element of a valid
transfer of title to real estate. Sneathen v. Sneathen (1891) 104
Mo. 201, 16 S. W. 497; Hammerslough v. Cheatham (1884) 84
Mo. 13. The delivery of a deed so far as the grantor is concerned
is a matter of intention. Coulson v. Coulson (1904) 180 Mo.
709, 79 S. W. 473. For a case involving deeds placed in escrow,
see Bales v. Roberts (1905) 189 Mo. 49, 87 S. W. 914. The solicit-
ing agent of an insurance company may hold a contract in escrow
for the insurance company and a prospective insured. Price v.
Home Ins. Co. (1893) 54 Mo. App. 119. See Whelan v. Tobener
(1897) 71 Mo. App. 361, where the issue of fact was: delivery un-
conditional or delivery in escrow? The custodian of an escrow is
the common agent of both parties and hence the preliminary de-
livery may be withdrawn by the consent of both parties. Peter-
man v. Peterman (1921) 286 Mo. 375, 228 S. W. 1062. See Anno-
tation under Section 103.
Section 102. WHAT AMOUNTS TO UNCONDITIONAL DELIVERY.
A promise under seal is delivered unconditionally when the
promisor puts it out of his possession with the apparent intent to
create immediately a contract under seal, unless the promisee then
knows that the promisor has not such actual intent.
Annotation:
As in the preceding Section, the principle of this Section is il-
lustrated in Missouri by cases relating to conveyances. Several
cases have approved the following description of an effective de-
livery: "The act must have been with the intent on the part of
the grantor to divest himself of title and it must have been ac-
cepted by the grantee with the intent to take the title as indicated
in the deed. These two acts are essential to a complete delivery
of the deed." See Ray v. Walker (1922) 293 Mo. 447, 240 S. W.
187. Alleged delivery of deed to third person to be turned over
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to grantee at death of grantor, is ineffective if grantor retains
dominion. Van Huff v. Wagner (1926) 315 Mo. 917, 287 S. W.
1038. But is effective if such dominion is surrendered. Mere-
dith v. Meredith (1921) 287 Mo. 250, 229 S. W. 179. Deed may
be delivered although never in physical possession of grantee.
Burke v. Adam (1883) 80 Mo. 504. In the following cases sur-
render of possession to a third person was held to be an uncon-
ditional delivery: Crites v. Crites (Mo. 1920) 225 S. W. 990, deed
to be delivered upon death of grantor but conveying present inter-
est; Burkey v. Burkey (Mo. 1915). 175 S. W. 623, surrender of
possession for purposes of recording; Huiser v. Beck (1894) 55
Mo. App. 668, surrender of control over chattel mortgage. In
the following cases the facts did not justify the conclusion of un-
conditional delivery: Peterman v. Crowley (Mo. 1920) 226 S. W.
944, mother's deed to son placed in bank and afterwards removed
by mother; Givens v. Ott (1909) 222 Mo. 395, 121 S. W. 23, no
notarial certificate or surrender of deed by notary until after
death of grantor; Vanstone v. Goodwin (1890) 42 Mo. App. 39,
a bank, though agent of grantee, possessed certificate of stock sub-
ject to recall of grantor. In Miles v. Robertson (1914) 258 Mo.
717, 167 S. W. 1000, an unusual set of facts was held to involve
delivery of a deed, the Court saying that delivery "may be shown
by acts without words, or words without acts, or by both com-
bined; and it may take place and the deed still remain in the pos-
session of the grantor".
See Simonton, Conveyancing-Delivery of Deeds, 27 Mo. Law
Bull. 69.
Section 103. WHAT AMOUNTS TO DELIVERY IN ESCROW AND
ITS EFFECT.
(1) A promise under seal is delivered in escrow by the promisor
when he puts it out of his possession without reserving a power
of revocation, and with the expressed intent that the promise shall
become a contract under seal upon the happening in the future of
some condition not expressed in the document, and shall not be-
come a contract under seal until that time. This condition must
be something other than the promisor's future mental desire or
intention.
(2) On the happening of such a condition as is stated in Sub-
section (1) the promise becomes a contract under seal. Until the
time has elapsed for the happening of the condition that was fixed
by the promisor when he delivered the document, or, if he theiV
fixed no time, until a reasonable time has elapsed for the happening
of the condition, the promisor has no power to annul the delivery.
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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Thereafter he has a right to reclaim the document, if the condition
has not happened.
Comment:
a. Delivery in escrow is to be distinguished from delivery to
hold as agent for the promisor.
Annotation:
The principle underlying this Section when applied to deeds
and other written instruments intended to be effective condition-
ally after delivery in escrow is in accord with Missouri law. In
Seibel v. Higham (1909) 216 Mo. 121, 115 S. W. 987, the Court
said: "The depositary of an escrow is sometimes spoken of as the
agent of the grantor and sometimes as the agent of both parties,
and whilst that may be correct, in a limited sense, yet strictly
speaking he is not an agent at all, he is a trustee of an express
trust, with duties to perform for each which neither can forbid
without the consent of the other. If he were the agent of the
grantor his agency would cease on the grantor's death and he
would have no authority to receive the purchase money from the
grantee and deliver the deed. But the death of the grantor does
not annul the depositary's authority to do what he was appointed
to do, and it does not impair the right of the grantee to perform
the condition and take down the deed." See also Bank of Hollister
v. O'Brien (1927) 220 Mo. App. 1276, 290 S. W. 1009, promissory
note delivered in escrow; Commerce Trust Co. v. White (1913) 172
Mo. App. 537, 158 S. W. 457, intent determines whether delivery is
unconditional or in escrow. The last sentence of Subsection (1)
is illustrated by the facts in Van Huff v. Wagner (1926) 315 Mo.
917,287 S. W. 1038. The second and third sentences of Subsection
(2) are illustrated by the facts in Longworth v. Farmers &
Traders Bank (1927) 222 Mo. App. 1, 300 S. W. 546. For other
escrow cases, see Annotation under Section 101. See also Mc-
Cleary, Some Problems in Conditional Deliveries of Deeds, 43
Mo. Law Bull. 5.
Section 104. ACCEPTANCE BY THE PROmISEE GENERALLY UN-
NECESSARY; DISCLAIMER PERMITTED.
(1) Acceptance by the promisee in the case of a promise under
seal is not essential to the formation of a unilateral contract, nor
is knowledge of the existence of the promise; but a promisee who
has not accepted such a promise may, within a reasonable time
after learning of its existence and terms, render it inoperative
from the beginning by disclaimer.
(2) Acceptance or disclaimer is irrevocable.
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Annotation:
There is a theoretical variance between the principle of this
Section and the Missouri law relating to the delivery of written
instruments. In Missouri acceptance by the promisee is neces-
sary. However, the practical results of this variance are insig-
nificant because of the Missouri doctrine that acceptance is pre-
sumed whenever the contract is beneficial to the promisee. In
Chambers v. Chambers (1910) 227 Mo. 262, 127 S. W. 86, the
court said: "To consummate a delivery acceptance by the grantee
is also an essential element; but it is a rule of law that acceptance
will be presumed where the grant is beneficial, and, in case the
grantee is the infant child of the grantor and the grant is bene-
ficial, courts of justice are fond of resting on a presumptive ac-
ceptance." To the same effect: Coulson v. Coulson (1904) 180
Mo. 709,79 S. W. 473, deed for benefit of infant. In the following
cases the facts failed to show the necessary acceptance: Miller V.
McCaleb (1907) 208 Mo. 562, 106 S. W. 655; Rogers v. Carey
(1871) 47 Mo. 232. The recording of a written instrument is
strong evidence of an intent by promisor to make delivery. Burkey
v. Burkey (Mo. 1915) 175 S. W. 623. But such recording is not
conclusive evidence that promisee has accepted. Miller v. Mc-
Caleb (1907) 208 Mo. 562, 106 S. W. 655.
Section 105. ACCEPTANCE BY THE PROMISEE, WHEN NECESSARY
TO CREATE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION.
Acceptance by the promisee or grantee in the case of a sealed
promissory writing or conveyance which purports to contain a re-
turn promise by him is essential to create any contractual obli4
gation.
Comment:
a. In order to subject the promisee or grantee to a duty he must
express assent thereto; and unless he makes the promise stated in
the writing, promises in his favor are equally inoperative, since it
is not contemplated that one promise shall be made without the
other.
b. The case of a grantee is included in this Section and in Sec-
tions 106 and 107 though the subject of this Restatement does not
include conveyances, because a deed of conveyance by A to B may
contain as one of its provisions a promise by B. It is the effect of
such a provision that is stated in these Sections.
Annotation:
Section 104 related to unilateral contracts. Section 105 relates
to bilateral contracts and the principle of the Section is undoubt-
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edly in accord with Missouri law. In Brownlow v. Wollard
(1895) 61 Mo. App. 124, the Court said: "The contract itself is
an agreement by defendant to do certain things, in consideration
of land having been deeded to him." To the same effect: Bredell
v. Kerr (1912) 242 Mo. 317, 147 S. W. 105, deed of land to college
on promissory conditions. In Stump v. Marshall (Mo. 1924) 266
S. W. 476, the principle was recognized but held inapplicable to
the facts. Acceptance by grantee, subsequent to execution of
deed, with implied return promise to cancel debt of grantor, can-
not relate back so as to defeat an intervening judgment lien.
Cravens v. Rossiter (1893) 116 Mo. 338, 22 S. W. 736. The prin-
ciple of the Section is illustrated by many Missouri cases where
property subject to a deed of trust securing a debt is conveyed
subject to a return promise by grantee to assume and pay off the
debt so secured. See Crone v. Stinde (1900) 156 Mo. 262, 55
S. W. 863.
Section 106. WHAT AMOUNTS TO ACCEPTANCE OF INSTRUMENT.
Acceptance in the case of a sealed promissory writing or convey-
ance consists of a manifestation of assent to the delivery thereof,
made to the promisor or grantor or to a person to whom the docu-
ment has been delivered in escrow. Such manifestation must
comply with any requirement imposed by the promisor or grantor.
It may be made either before or after delivery. If made before de-
livery it is revocable until the moment of delivery.
Annotation:
This Section seems to be in accord with the law of Missouri. In
McNear v. Williamson (1902) 166 Mo. 358, 66 S. W. 160, the evi-
dence as to delivery and acceptance of deed was held to produce
a negative conclusion. In Burkey v. Burkey (Mo. 1915) 175
S. W. 623, the deed was accepted by the grantee while in the physi-
cal possession of a person other than the grantor and after gran-
tor's death. When facts are clear, the questions of delivery and
acceptance are to be decided by the court and not by the jury;
"to hold otherwise is to put our land titles on a very uncertain
foundation". Allen v. DeGroodt (1891) 105 Mo. 442, 16 S. W.
494.
Section 107. ACCEPTANCE BY PROMISEE MAY CREATE IN-
FORMAL CONTRACT.
One who accepts but does not sign or seal a sealed document
which contains not only a conveyance or a promise to him or for
his benefit, but also words expressing a promise by him, thereby
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makes the promise expressed in the document, but the promise so
made by him is not under seal, and whether it is binding depends
upon the rules governing informal contracts.
Annotation:
Since the Act of 1893 all contracts under seal (formal) are to
be regarded as simple (informal) contracts. Therefore, this Sec-
tion 107 is in accord with Missouri law, because it is evident that
the promisee's promise is supported by a consideration. Before
the Act of 1893 the distinction between a sealed and unsealed con-
tract was recognized. Shuetze 'v. Bailey (1867) 40 Mo. 69, an
instrument purporting to be sealed although invalid as a deed,
held to be evidence of a simple contract; Bentzen v. Zierlein
(1836) 4 Mo. 417, one partner unable to bind another by sealed
instrument unless authorized by sealed instrument.
Section 108. PROMISOR AND PROMISEE MUST BE NAMED OR
DESCRIBED IN THE WRITING.
A promise under seal is not operative as a contract under seal
unless both the promisor and the promisee are named or so de-
scribed therein as to be capable of identification when the writing
is delivered.
Comment:
a. It is a requirement of a sealed contract that all facts essen-
tial to a determination of all the terms of the contract appear in
the document. Attempts to make a contract under seal, which
are ineffectual as such for failure to observe this principle, may,
however, create an informal contract, if the requirements of such
a contract exist.
Annotation:
Prior to the Act of 1893 the principle of this Section was prob-
ably in accord with Missouri law. See Arthur v. Weston (1856)
22 Mo. 378, deed to Phelps & Co., although intended to convey to
three persons, conveyed legal title to one only. However, in
Field v. Stagg (1873) 52 Mo. 534, a deed delivered to agent with
blank space for unidentified grantee's name was held valid after
insertion of grantee's name pursuant to parol authority. Since
the Act of 1893 the principle of this Section has disappeared and
Missouri law for all contracts would seem to be in accord with
the second sentence of the Comment. Although without refer-
ence to the statute, Cheney ,v. Eggert (1917) 197 Mo. App. 649,
199 S. W. 270, held that a deed with blank space for grantee's
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name is binding even after delivery to grantee in an action at law
to enforce grantee's assumption of mortgage debt.
Section 109. PROMISEE MAY ENFORCE SEALED CONTRACT
THOUGH HE DOES NOT SIGN OR SEAL IT.
The promisee of a promise under seal is not precluded from en-
forcing it as a sealed contract because he has not signed or sealed
the document, unless, his doing so was a condition of the delivery,
whether the document does or does not contain also a promise by
him.
Comment:
a. Other circumstances (as indicated by Sections 105 and 107)
than the fact that the promisee has not signed or sealed the docu-
ment may prevent the promisee from acquiring a right, but the
failure to sign or seal does not itself have this effect, unless a con-
dition to that effect is imposed when the document is delivered.
Annotation:
It is elementary in Missouri that the promisee in a written con-
tract signed by the promisor, after delivery to and acceptance by
the promisee, has rights against the promisor even if the promisee
has not signed the contract, unless such signing by the promisee
is made a condition precedent to the validity of the contract. See
Aiple-Hemmelmann R. E. Co. v. Spelbrink (1908) 211 Mo. 671,
111 S. W. 480, written contract intended to be signed by both par-
ties, but as a matter of fact signed only by promisor, held good at
suit of promisee.
Section 110. SEALED CONTRACT DOESNOTNEEDCONSIDERATION.
It is not essential in order to make a promise under seal oper-
ative as a sealed contract that consideration be given for the
promise.
Annotation:
This Section is sharply at variance with the Act of 189S (R. S.
Mo. 1929, Sec. 2957) : "The use of private seals in written con-
tracts, conveyances of real estate, and all other instruments of
writing heretofore required by law to be sealed (except the seals
of corporations), is hereby abolished, but the addition of a private
seal to any such instrument shall not in any manner affect its
force, validity or character, or in any way change the construction
thereof."
This Section 110 is also at variance with the Act of 1845, slight-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss2/1
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
ly amended in 1855, (R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 954): "Whenever a
specialty or other written contract for the payment of money, or
the delivery of property, or for the performance of a duty, shall
be the foundation of an action or defense in whole or in part, or
shall be given in evidence in any court without being pleaded, the
proper party may prove the want or failure of the consideration,
in whole or in part, of such specialty or other written contract."
This Section 110 should be considered in connection with the
Act of 1885, slightly amended in 1865, (R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec.
2958) : "All instruments of writing made and signed by any per-
son or his agent, whereby he shall promise to pay to any other, or
his order, or unto bearer, any sum of money or property therein
mentioned, shall import a consideration, and be due and payable
as therein specified."
The Act of 1835, purely a procedural statute and having no ef-
fect on substantive law, recognized the common law rule that in
an action on a sealed contract it was unnecessary to plead any
consideration. The effect of the statute was to continue this rule
with reference to sealed instruments and also to extend the rule
to other signed written contracts. In County of Montgomery v.
Auchley (1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W. 425, the court said: "Gener-
ally, in cases of simple contracts, the consideration should be
formally and expressly pleaded. But this rule has no application
to contracts under seal and negotiable instruments, for they im-
port a consideration. 1 Chitty's Plead. 262; Bliss on Code Plead.,
sec. 268. By force of our statute non-negotiable instruments also
import a consideration. Taylor v. Newman, 77 Mo. 257. This
statute also applies to a large class of contracts in writing which
do not come under the designation of negotiable or non-negotiable
notes or bills, and in all cases to which the statute applies it is not
necessary to plead the consideration. Caples v. Branham, 20 Mo.
244. The defendants' undertaking is alleged to be under seal.
If not sealed, the contract is one within the statute, and it was not
necessary to set out the consideration in the petition, or that plain-
tiff should make proof of it in the first instance. If the defend-
ant relies upon a want of consideration he should plead it." Wulze
v. Schaefer (1889) 37 Mo. App. 551 construes the Statute of 1835,
and applies it to a contingent promise to pay money. See also
Greer v. Nutt (1893) 54 Mo. App. 4.
Act of 1845. Although appearing in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, the most important practical effect of this statute has been
in the domain of substantive law. The equitable rule as to the
rebuttable presumption that a consideration supports every sealed
contract has been extended to all written contracts at law as well
as in equity, whether sealed or unsealed. "At common law, a
failure of the consideration of a bond, whether partial or total,
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was no defence to an action on the instrument. A partial or total
failure of the consideration of a note might be used as a defence
to an action upon it. Our statute has now abolished all distinc-
tions between bonds and notes in this respect, and a failure of
consideration, in whole or in part, may be given in evidence to de-
feat or diminish the recovery in an action on those instruments."
Smith v. Busby (1852) 15 Mo. 387. See also Winter v. Kansas
City Cable Ry. Co. (1897) 73 Mo. App. 173.
Act of 1893. The terminology of this Missouri statute suggests
accord with the terminology of the Restatement because it seems
to distinguish between contracts and conveyances.
As to private seals of individuals the meaning is unmistakable.
A deed is a deed even if unsealed. State v. Tobie (1897) 141 Mo.
547, 42 S. W. 1076. As to corporate seals, the law seems to be
that if a corporation has adopted a seal, then a seal must be at-
tached to a corporate conveyance of real estate by reason of our
statute on conveyances, but a corporation is not required to adopt
a seal and the corporate conveyance is valid if the corporate
grantor has no seal. Puflis v. Puflis Bros. Iron Co. (1900) 157
Mo. 565, 57 S. W. 1095. Apparently all other "specialties", when
executed by a corporation, are valid even if unsealed. This is
certainly true of a judicial bond. State ex rel Spellman v. Parke-
Davis & Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 219, 177 S. W. 1070, the court
saying that a bond is "no different from any other simple con-
tract." See Annotation under Section 7. See also Albers v.
Acme Paving & Crusher Co. (1917) 196 Mo. App. 265, 194 S. W.
61, unsealed deed to land from a corporation having a seal good
in collateral proceeding; Strop v. Hughes (1907) 123 Mo. App.
547, 101 S. W. 146, unsealed chattel mortgage by corporation.
See Smith, Seals-Effect of Statute, 10 Mo. Law Bull. 59; Rosen-
wald, The History of the Missouri Law of Sealed Instruments, 16
St. Louis L. Rev. 124.
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